Relearning the art of war

by being less of a warrior and more of a peacemaker, less of a shooter and more of a thinker.

Ullrich Fichtner of Spiegel Online:
"The notion that the world's most modern and powerful military machine could end up struggling to gain the upper hand over scattered insurgents was inconceivable and hit the US military like an earthquake. Until a few years ago, no one in the US military would have believed that instead of dropping bombs and engaging in fierce combat, it would one day be drilling wells, directing traffic, building schools and organizing local elections -- and that it would be doing all of these things not after but in the middle of a war. Finally, no one would have imagined that these civilian tools would end up being described as the most-effective weapons on the road to victory."
[snip]
"It took commanders who could implement changes and who had the courage to question the Pentagon's old-school way of thinking and its approach to the war in Iraq. The process began in Leavenworth, in 2004, with William Wallace, the general who had commanded the US Army's "Thunder Run" to Baghdad in the initial stage of the war. But once it became increasingly evident that Iraq was in turmoil, Wallace began to doubt his own hard-hitting strategy and reinterpret the operation's successes and failures. As it turned out, Wallace was the first to question all the military doctrines that had been in place until then. His direct successor is currently in the process of eliminating them altogether."
[snip]
"The 241-page document contains an outline of the history of all rebellions and a guide to the wars of the future. For the first time, it draws no distinction between civilian and classic military operations. In fact, it almost equates the importance of the two. Petraeus believes that the military can no longer win wars with military might alone. On the contrary, according to the new theory, it must do its utmost to avoid large-scale destruction and, by as early as the initial attack, not only protect the civilian population but also support it with all available means in order to secure its cooperation for regime change. As uncomplicated as it may seem, Petraeus's new doctrine represents a sea change when it comes to the US military's training and combat procedures. Some might also interpret it as a way of settling scores with the failed strategy in Iraq." "
[snip]
"The group of instructors sitting around the conference table is responsible for the new army's core issue: cultural awareness, or the art of handling multiculturalism and practicing tolerance and respect for foreigners. The people sitting around the table have served as diplomats and intelligence agents in Israel and Jordan and as military attachés in Syria. Their job is to give these young soldiers a crash course in how to deal with other cultures in general and Islam in particular.

"Arabs are not always Muslims, and Muslims do not always think the way Arabs do," says Kerry, citing an example of the kind of message he and his colleagues are here to instill in the officers. The uniformed students must work their way through long lists of lectures and read 300-400 pages a day -- new textbooks about the modern world, as well as classics like Clausewitz and the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. In an effort to teach skepticism and critical thinking, the instructors are constantly asking their students trick questions and presenting them with paradoxes, rewiring their brains to help them understand the new military doctrine."